---
type: Assessment
title: Audits and an independent assessment of accepted findings
description: Audits covering Ensuro core v3, the Multi-Strategy Vault and the access-managed proxy, and an independent, finding-by-finding assessment of every acknowledged (not fixed) issue for a Senior LP.
tags: [security, audits, assessment]
claim_basis: [document, code, onchain, independent-estimate]
status: draft
generated: { by: grok-bot/lp-bundle-v0.2, at: 2026-11-17T15:30:00-03:00 }
verified: { by: grok-bot/code-check, at: 2026-11-17T15:30:00-03:00 }
stale_after: 2027-02-17T00:00:00-03:00
sources:
  - id: qs3
    resource: https://github.com/ensuro/ensuro/blob/main/audits/Quantstamp-Ensuro-v3-Final-Report-2025-12-17.pdf
    title: Quantstamp, Ensuro v3 final report (2025-12-17)
    author: org:quantstamp
  - id: qsv
    resource: https://github.com/ensuro/vaults/blob/main/audits/2025-03-Quantstamp-Final-Audit-Report.pdf
    title: Quantstamp, Ensuro vaults final report (review 2025-02-24 to 2025-03-03)
    author: org:quantstamp
  - id: aa3
    resource: https://github.com/ensuro/vaults/blob/main/audits/2026-09-audit_agent_report_3_findings.md
    title: Nethermind AuditAgent report 3 on ensuro/vaults (2026-09) and Ensuro responses
  - id: aa2
    resource: https://github.com/ensuro/access-managed-proxy/blob/main/audits/audit_agent_report_2_findings.md
    title: Nethermind AuditAgent report 2 on access-managed-proxy (2026-09-17) and Ensuro responses
  - id: older
    resource: https://github.com/ensuro/ensuro/tree/main/audits
    title: Earlier reviews (SlowMist 2021, Quantstamp 2022, DeFiSafety process review)
  - id: snap
    resource: /metrics/latest.json
    title: On-chain snapshot, Ethereum block 26,436,335 (2026-11-17 14:43:35 America/Buenos_Aires)
  - id: ensuro-1117
    resource: Ensuro team answers to LP due-diligence questions, 2026-11-17
    title: Ensuro team statements (unverified)
    author: team:ensuro
---

# Audit coverage

| Scope | Reviewer | Date | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ensuro core v3 (PolicyPool, eTokens, premiums accounts, risk modules) | Quantstamp | report 2025-12-17 | 13 findings: 8 fixed, 5 acknowledged; suggestions S1–S4[^qs3] |
| Vaults (MSV, outflow limit, strategies) | Quantstamp | 2025-02-24 to 03-03 | 7 findings: 4 fixed, 3 acknowledged[^qsv] |
| Vaults | Nethermind AuditAgent (automated) | 2026-09 | 28 findings, all acknowledged with responses[^aa3] |
| Access-managed proxy | Nethermind AuditAgent (automated) | 2026-09-17 | 2 Medium acknowledged, 1 Low documented, 1 Info[^aa2] |
| Earlier versions | SlowMist (2021), Quantstamp (2022), DeFiSafety process review | — | earlier code[^older] |

Ensuro states there is **no bug bounty**.[^ensuro-1117]

# Independent assessment of acknowledged findings

This is the bundle's own reading of each accepted finding against the deployed configuration, not Ensuro's and not the auditors'. It does not rely on any third-party memo.

## Ensuro core v3 (Quantstamp)[^qs3]

| Finding | Auditor severity | Relevance to a Senior LP | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| ENSR-2 Yield-vault losses can block vault migration and correct accounting | Medium | **Real, currently thin headroom** | Not attacker-triggered. It bites when a yield-vault loss (which can also block migrating to another vault) on the premiums account exceeds its remaining max-deficit headroom. Spot's headroom at the snapshot is about $32k ($329,292 max deficit − $297,259 deficit).[^snap] Effect is operational (payouts and repayments stall until governance recapitalizes); MSV losses already hit Senior holders pro rata through the eToken. Ensuro's mitigation: a governance grant, or changing or removing the yield vault.[^ensuro-1117] A deficit-ratio increase would widen the headroom. |
| ENSR-3 SCR manipulation can halt or throttle LP withdrawals | Low | Low–Medium (liquidity) | Needs a privileged or compromised component. With liquidity requirement 100% and max utilization 95%, `lockScr` keeps ≥5% withdrawable, but internal loans can push utilization above 95%. Affects liquidity, not principal by itself. |
| ENSR-11 Incident near policy expiration may not be paid | Low | Neutral to positive | Affects policyholders (no payout after expiry); for LPs it makes SCR release deterministic. |
| ENSR-12 Centralized stablecoin can be frozen | Informational | Systemic | Low likelihood, high impact; common to every USDC protocol. |
| ENSR-13 Missing zero-address check for the optional Senior eToken in `_borrowFromEtk` | Informational | None | A Senior eToken is configured for Spot. |

ENSR-8 (Senior loan limit used a strict inequality) is **fixed**.

## Vaults (Quantstamp)[^qsv]

| Finding | Severity | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ENS-5 SwapStable strategy assumes a fixed price | Low | **Relevant**: the OpenEden USDO strategy (4.3% of the MSV) is a SwapStable strategy at a fixed price of 1. A USDO depeg would be mispriced in `totalAssets` until rebalanced. Exposure is bounded by the allocation. |
| ENS-6 Possible double counting of assets | Informational | Configuration-dependent; Ensuro tests that `totalAssets` is unchanged by configuration operations. |
| ENS-7 Changing `slotSize` resets outflow history | Undetermined | Requires the Admin Safe and the 4-day timelock, so it is visible in advance. Ensuro notes the window logic is a modifiable parameter.[^ensuro-1117] |

## Vaults (AuditAgent, automated)[^aa3]

- Items labelled High (locked Ether, Aave `getReserveData` reentrancy) are, on this configuration, effectively informational: the vault holds USDC only and the call path has no exploitable state change.
- **Relevant to LP exit expectations:** `maxWithdraw` over-reports what can actually leave, because it ignores both the outflow cap (#10) and strategies' executable liquidity (#7). Treat it as an upper bound.
- Low impact on this deployment: #3 (32-strategy panic, unreachable with 8 strategies), #4 (SwapStableAave resupply, only if that strategy is used), #5 (double count, configuration), #6 (direct-balance dilution, mitigated by whitelisted LPs), #8–9 (Compound harvest, just-in-time rewards; low with whitelisted LPs), #11–12 (replace/remove-strategy quirks, operational).
- #13–28: code quality.

## Access-managed proxy (AuditAgent)[^aa2]

The two Medium items (an incompatible authority could brick the proxy; delayed AccessManager operations and relayed calls see `msg.sender` as the AccessManager) are governance and configuration risks. They do not bypass timelocks.

# Overall

No accepted finding allows an outside attacker to take Senior funds on the deployed configuration, in this reading. The material residual risks are governance/key risk, thin premiums-account headroom (ENSR-2), the fixed-price stable strategy (ENS-5) and over-reported withdrawable amounts.

[^qs3]: Quantstamp Ensuro v3 report
[^qsv]: Quantstamp vaults report
[^aa3]: AuditAgent report 3, vaults
[^aa2]: AuditAgent report 2, access-managed proxy
[^older]: Earlier reviews
[^snap]: On-chain snapshot, block 26,436,335
[^ensuro-1117]: Ensuro team statements, 2026-11-17 (unverified)
